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COMPARISON IN INTERSECTIONAL DISCRIMINATION 
[forthcoming in Legal Studies] 
 
Shreya Atrey* 
Max Weber Fellow, European University Institute, Florence 




This article considers the use of comparison in establishing multi-ground 
claims of intersectional discrimination. Leading examples of test cases from 
the US and the UK exemplify the challenges in using comparison to establish 
discrimination against Black women, based on the grounds of both race and 
sex. These challenges include—the insistence on using a single mirror 
comparator (viz. white men) or the difficulties in choosing multiple 
comparators from a range of options (viz. white women, Asian women, Black 
men, white men etc), the missing rationale for the selection, and the 
unwieldiness in actually appreciating the nature of intersectional 
discrimination based on this exercise. To overcome these, Canadian courts 
have relaxed the strict requirement of necessarily resorting to comparison for 
proving discrimination and switched to the flexible approach. However, in 
practice, flexible approach appears as fastidious as strict comparison in its 
selection and use of comparators. Thus, neither of the two approaches has 
been too helpful in supporting intersectional claims. The article argues that 
instead, a useful way of proving intersectional discrimination is to follow the 
South African approach of making comparisons contextually: (i) between all 
relevant comparators, identified in reference to one, some, and all of the 
grounds or personal characteristics; and (ii) sifting through comparative 
evidence with the purpose of establishing similar and different patterns of 
group disadvantage which characterise the nature of intersectional 
discrimination. This approach brings both principle and purpose to employing 
comparison and can be especially useful in appreciating intersectional 




The speciality of discrimination law is that the cause (an act, measure, 
provision, policy, criterion etc) is connected to the effect (discrimination) by 
‘grounds’. Thus, it is not only necessary to show that something happened 
and led to an harmful affect, but also that the act was based on or the effects 
were suffered on the basis of certain personal characteristics or grounds like 
race, caste, sex, gender, sexual orientation, age, disability etc. 1  The 
comparator test helps establish this connection between discriminatory 
impact and its basis in grounds. It does so in this way: the claimant has to 
show that a real or hypothetical individual or group, which does not share 
the claimant’s personal characteristic, but is otherwise similarly situated, is 
better off.2 Courts can then conclude that discriminatory treatment or impact 
was based on the personal characteristic of the claimant. For example, in 
order to claim sex discrimination successfully, a female employee would 
                                                 
*  For their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this article, many thanks are due 
to Sandra Fredman, Marl Bell, Kate O’Regan, David Oppenheimer, Miles Jackson, 
Gautam Bhatia, Laurie Jane Anderson, participants of the Resident Fellows Forum at 
NYU Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice held in April 2016 and members of 
the Berkeley Comparative Anti-Discrimination Law Virtual Study Group meeting held 
in January 2015. I am also grateful for the comments of two anonymous peer 
reviewers which helped shape the final draft of the article.   
 1  John Gardner, ‘On the Ground of Her Sex(uality)’ (1998) 18 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 167; Tarunabh Khaitan, A Theory of Discrimination Law (OUP 2015) 165–
171.  
2  See in particular leading judicial and statutory formulations of the comparator tests 
in the context of the Great Britain in Equality Act 2010, s 23; the US in Teamsters v 
United States (1977) 431 US 324 [footnote 15] (SC); Canada in Hodge v Canada 
(Minister of Human Resources Development) [2004] 3 SCR 357 [1], [20]ff (SCC) 
(Hodge) and Withler v Canada [2011] 1 SCR 396 [41]ff (SCC) (Withler); South Africa 
in MEC for Education, Kwa-Zulu Natal v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC) [42]–[44] (Langa 
CJ), [164]–[165] (O’Regan J).  
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show that she was treated less favourably by her employer than a man with 
the same responsibilities and role in an establishment.   
 But not every case of discrimination yields itself to the comparator 
test. The ostensible simplicity of this approach can be especially deceptive for 
intersectional claims based on more than one ground of discrimination. An 
intersectional claim is one which reflects ‘intersectionality’. The term was 
coined by Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw in 1989 and it stands for the idea that 
discrimination on the basis of multiple grounds signifies a distinct 
disadvantage which is both similar to and different from that based on 
individual grounds.3 It can be imagined in terms of the qualities of a Venn 
diagram such that—the portion where the spheres intersect represents some 
unique features of its own, and also shares some features of the individual 
spheres. 4  For example, the position of disabled Black women can be 
                                                 
3  Kimberlé W Crenshaw, ‘Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist 
Politics’ (1989) University of Chicago Legal Forum 139, 149; Sumi Cho, Kimberlé W 
Crenshaw and Leslie McCall, ‘Toward a Field of Intersectionality Studies: Theory, 
Applications, and Praxis’ (2013) 38 Signs 785, 787. 
4  See for a depiction of the Venn diagram, Shreya Atrey, ‘Lifting as We Climb: 
Recognising Intersectional Gender Violence in Law’ (2015) 5 Onati Socio-Legal Series 
1512, 1516–1520. See also Figure 1 below. The reference to a Venn diagram here 
should not be taken to indicate an understanding of intersectionality as intersection 
of separate spheres of disadvantage (sexism, racism etc) which exist independently 
and collide only in respect of some intersectional groups (Black women). The fear of 
this interpretation with the use of Venn diagrams has been noted by Devon Carbado 
and Mitu Gulati in Acting White? Rethinking Race in “Post-Racial” America (OUP 
2013) 71. This article adopts a view of intersectionality as representing a form of 
disadvantage which is fundamentally co-constituted by multiple systems of 
disadvantage. The Venn diagram aids this understanding by explaining the nature of 
intersectional disadvantage of some groups like Black women as something similar 
to, and at the same time, different from disadvantage of other groups like Black 
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imagined as located at the centre of three intersecting spheres of 
disadvantage suffered by the groups of disabled persons, Blacks, and women. 
The point at which all these spheres intersect reflects: (i) the unique 
disadvantage suffered by disabled Black women, which is not suffered by a 
group like non-disabled white men in any way since they are located outside 
of the intersecting spheres; and (ii) the disadvantage they share with disabled 
persons, Blacks and women, as well as, the characteristics of disadvantage of 
two of these spheres (groups) as disabled women, disabled Blacks, and Black 
women. In this way, each of the groups located around the intersection 
signify the distinct nature of intersectional discrimination – as similar and 
different patterns of group disadvantage – suffered by disabled Black 
women.  
 So if a disabled Black woman brings a discrimination claim on the 
basis of her disability, race, and gender, who would her comparator(s) be?5 
                                                                                                                               
men, white women, and white men. It does not undercut the simultaneity, 
complexity, and co-constitutive nature of intersectional disadvantage, but helps 
relate it to the framework of discrimination law which is based on grounds and is 
meant to alleviate the historical and abiding forms of substantial group 
disadvantage. For a justification of such a basis of discrimination law, see, Khaitan (n 
1), Nicola Lacey, ‘From Individual to Group’ in Bob Hepple and Erika Szyszczak (eds), 
Discrimination: The Limits of the Law (Mansell 1992); Marius Pieterse, ‘Finding for 
the Applicant? Individual Equality Plaintiffs and Group-Based Disadvantage’ (2008) 
24 South African Journal on Human Rights 397. 
5  A preliminary challenge lies in imagining and accepting that such a claim is in fact 
possible. Sceptics have long doubted whether discrimination other than that based 
on a single ground exists and if at all it did, how complex could it possibly be? 
Readers of this article would have to collude with the premise that intersectional 
discrimination exists in all its complexity as possible. For instance, in Norville v 
Staten Island University Hospital (1999) 196 F3d 89 (2d Cir), Wendy Norville, a black 
disabled woman argued that the hospital had discriminated against her by 
 5 
Would the comparator have to be someone who does not share any of her 
personal characteristics, i.e. a non-disabled white man—a universal 
comparator who belongs to none of the disadvantaged groups? Or would 
each ground require a separate comparator obtained by replacing the 
disadvantaged group with its cognate privileged group, i.e. for disability – a 
non-disabled Black woman; for race – a disabled white woman; and for 
gender – a disabled Black man? Or could other comparators which do not 
share two of the claimant’s identities also be relevant, i.e. disabled white 
man, non-disabled white woman, non-disabled Black man? Which of the 
seven possible comparator groups are relevant in proving the claimant’s 
case?6 Could we also consider comparators beyond the trite binaries of 
disabled/non-disabled, white/Black, women/men to see comparator groups 
more closely based on their nature of disabilities, ethnicities, and genders? 
What determines these choices and how does it help establish an 
intersectional claim? This article is dedicated to these inquiries. 
                                                                                                                               
‘refus[ing] to accommodate her disability despite having made job accommodations 
for two disabled white nurses.’ Her claim failed because she could not convince the 
Court that other similarly situated nurses were treated better. The failure of such 
complex cases does not obliterate the basis of their existence and only goes on to 
show that such discrimination can exist, whether or not we choose to address it qua 
discrimination law. 
6  Mathematically, the number of possible comparators – groups which share none of 
the characteristics and those which share one or some of the characteristics – for a 
claim involving ‘N’ number of grounds can be calculated based on the formula: 
𝐶𝑁 ≔ ∑ (
𝑁
𝑘






 is a binomial coefficient, 𝑙! ≔ 𝑙(𝑙 − 1)(𝑙 −
2)…2 is a factorial, and the sum goes over all k from 1 to N. For instance, for a 
claim of three characteristics or grounds, based on the formula, 𝐶3 = 7 comparisons 
can be made by a court. The question remains how does one actually choose from 
and use the array of possible comparators in intersectional claims.  
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 Intersectional discrimination has evaded sophisticated discrimination 
regimes like the US, the UK and Canada.7 In the US, after the failure of the 
seminal test case of intersectional discrimination (DeGraffenreid v General 
Motors8), courts have admitted a limited idea of ‘sex plus’ or ‘race plus’ 
discrimination, where each ground has to be proved individually and each 
such claim is limited to two grounds only.9 In the UK, though Equality Act 
2010 (which applies to England and Wales) recognises ‘combined 
discrimination’ in Section 14, the provision has never been brought into 
force. Even so, it is limited to direct discrimination based on an exhaustive list 
of protected characteristics, capping their number in a claim of ‘combined 
discrimination’, like the US, to two. The result is in line with the England and 
Wales Court of Appeal’s decision in Bahl v Law Society,10 which remains a 
rare case of a discrimination claim to be argued on two grounds at that level. 
On the other hand, while the Canadian Supreme Court has generally 
acknowledged the idea of intersectional discrimination, 11  it has never 
adjudicated a claim based on multiple grounds. The Ontario Court of Appeal’s 
                                                 
7  Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (2nd edn, OUP 2011) 139–145.   
8  413 F Supp 142 (ED Mo 1976) (DeGraffenreid). 
9  Jefferies v Harris County Community Action Association (1980) 615 F2d 1025, 1033 
(5th Cir); Vasquez v County of LA (2003) 349 F3d 634 (9th Cir); Rogers v American 
Airlines, Inc (1981) 527 FSupp 229 (SDNY); Coleman v B-G Maintainence 
Management, Inc (1997) 108 F3d 1199 (10th Cir). 
10  [2004] EWCA Civ 1070 (England and Wales Court of Appeal) (Bahl). 
11  Mossop v Canada (Attorney General) [1993] 1 SCR 554, 645 (SCC) L'Heureux-Dubé J, 
dissenting) (Mossop). 
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decision in Falkiner v Ontario12 is often seen as a leading example which 
comes close to, but ultimately not on all fours with, intersectionality.13 In 
contrast, the South African Constitution under Section 9(3) recognises that 
discrimination could be based on ‘one or more grounds’ and the 
Constitutional Court has received such multi-ground claims favourably.14 But 
the concept of intersectional discrimination is far from mainstream in any of 
these discrimination regimes.15 The fact that the reservoirs of discrimination 
jurisprudence remain high and dry of intersectional claims has spurred a 
critical examination of the body of discrimination law and its central concepts 
like grounds in assisting complex cases of discrimination. 16  The article 
                                                 
12  [2002] OJ No 1771 (Court of Appeal for Ontario) (Falkiner). 
13  See Daphne Gilbert and Diana Majury, ‘Critical Comparisons: The Supreme Court of 
Canada Dooms Section 15’ (2006) 24 Windsor Year Book of Access to Justice 111; 
Diana Majury, ‘The Charter, Equality Rights, and Women: Equivocation and 
Celebration’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 297.  
14  Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); Hassam v Jacobs (NO) [2009] 
ZACC 19 (CC) (Hassam).  
15  This has not discouraged seminal contributions on the subject which include: Gay 
Moon, ‘Multiple Discrimination: Justice for the Whole Person’ (2009) 2 Journal of 
the European Roma Rights Centre 5; Jennifer C Nash, ‘Re-Thinking Intersectionality’ 
(2008) 89 Feminist Review 1; Joanne Conaghan, ‘Intersectionality and UK Equality 
Initiatives’ (2007) 23 South African Journal on Human Rights 317; Iyiola Solanke, 
‘Putting Race and Gender Together: A New Approach To Intersectionality’ (2009) 72 
Modern Law Review 723; Sarah Hannett, ‘Equality at the Intersections: The 
Legislative and Judicial Failure to Tackle Multiple Discrimination’ (2003) 23 Oxford 
Journal of Legal Studies 65; Douglas Kropp, ‘“Categorical” Failure: Canada’s Equality 
Jurisprudence—Changing Notions of Identity and the Legal Subject’ (1997) 23 
Queen’s Law Journal 201.  
16  Excellent analyses on the nature of grounds and their categorical application appear 
in: Daphne Gilbert, ‘Time to Regroup: Rethinking Section 15 of the Charter’ (2003) 
48 McGill Law Journal 627; Denise G Réaume, ‘Of Pigeon Holes and Principles: A 
Reconsideration of Discrimination Law’ (2002) 40 Osgoode Hall Law Journal 113; 
Dianne Pothier, ‘Connecting Grounds of Discrimination to Real People’s Real 
Experiences’ (2001) 13 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 3925; Nitya Iyer, 
‘Categorical Denials: Equality Rights and the Shaping of Social Identity’ (1993) 19 
Queen’s Law Journal 179.  
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contributes to this line of inquiry by analysing another central aspect of 
discrimination law – the heuristic of comparison – to examine what about 
this chief tool makes it highly resistant to intersectionality and thus makes 
intersectional claims highly unlikely to succeed.  
 The article proceeds as follows. In Part 2, I take the examples of 
DeGraffenreid and Bahl to show that the approach of ‘strict’ comparison, i.e. 
the requirement of using a single mirror comparator to establish a multi-
ground claim, is untenable because: (i) the selection of comparators based on 
this approach is too unprincipled and complicated; and (ii) their use 
ultimately fails to explicate the intersectional nature of disadvantage based 
on multiple grounds. In Part 3, I consider the case of Falkiner to see if the 
‘flexible’ approach to comparison alleviates the enduring concerns. While the 
flexible approach eliminates the necessity of a single mirror comparator, its 
own use of multiple comparators is as fastidious as in strict comparison and 
in fact left unsubstantiated. Part 4 then proceeds to offer an alternative to 
the strict and flexible approaches to comparators. The South African example 
of Hassam presents a healthy halfway house in using comparison, as a helpful 
heuristic rather than as a requirement for establishing intersectional 
discrimination. Hassam’s ‘contextual’ approach of closely analysing the 
similarities and differences between all relevant comparator groups 
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exemplifies how recourse to comparison can be made in a principled and 
purposeful way to establish intersectional claims.  
 It is useful to note that the references from the US, the UK, Canada 
and South Africa are not meant for the purpose of comparing their respective 
doctrinal positions; but to shine a spotlight on the key approaches to 
comparison in multi-ground claims which served as test cases of 
intersectional discrimination in these jurisdictions. Because of the lack of an 
established or successful record of intersectional claims, these early attempts 
are telling in their quest for making comparison respond to intersectionality 
and in turn the quest for making intersectional claims successful in 
discrimination law. The point this limited but incisive doctrinal survey makes 
is then a conceptual one: that the judicial use of comparison often does not 
accord with the requirements of multi-ground intersectional claims. In order 
that comparison may still be useful, it needs to be reimagined within the 
existing discourse of discrimination law in reference to the demands of 
intersectionality. Thus, in proposing contextual comparisons, the article 
contributes to the goal of overcoming, what Crenshaw called, ‘dominant 
ways of thinking about discrimination.’17 The article furthers the project of 
transforming the traditional boundaries of discrimination law based on a 
                                                 
17  Crenshaw (n 3) 150. 
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single ground, to accommodate multi-ground claims of intersectional 
discrimination, via a recalibrated vision of comparison. 
 
2. Strict Comparison 
 
Some form of comparison or relative disadvantage is necessary in proving 
‘discrimination’ under sections 703–704 of the Civil Rights Act 1964 of the US; 
‘less favourable treatment’ or ‘particular disadvantage’ under Sections 13, 14 
and 19 of the Equality Act 2010; ‘discrimination’ under Section 15(1) of the 
Canadian Charter; or ‘differentiation’ and ‘unfair discrimination’ under 
Section 9(3) of the South African Constitution. However, the form and 
content of the comparator requirement differs substantially between 
jurisdictions.  
 Strict comparison can be earmarked as one where it is necessary to 
use a real or hypothetical comparator in order to show relative disadvantage 
based on grounds for proving wrongful discrimination. The appropriate 
comparator is one ‘with whom the claimant shares the characteristics 
relevant to qualification for the benefit or burden in question apart from the 
personal characteristic that is said to be the ground of the wrongful 
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discrimination.’18 The exercise of finding this single ‘mirror’ comparator is 
strict, i.e. it is necessary for establishing discrimination. 
 This version of the comparator test has been popular in the US and 
the UK, and in Canada until recently. In the US, though not statutorily 
required, strict comparison is essential to proving discrimination.19 The UK 
test is similar in that the comparison has to be with someone who closely 
resembles the claimant but-for the personal characteristic being pleaded as 
the ground of discrimination.20 The Canadian Supreme Court too, before 
switching to the flexible approach described in the next section, had 
considered strict comparison central to discrimination cases.21  
                                                 
18  Hodge (n 2) [1] [23] (emphasis in original).  
19  US Civil Rights Act 1964, Title VII, ss 703–704. See Ash v Tyson Foods, Inc (2006) 546 
US 454 (SC); Miller-El v Dretke (2005) 545 US 231 (SC); Knight v Baptist Hospital of 
Miami, Inc (2003) 330 F3d 1313 (11th Cir); Gossett v Okla ex rel Bd of Regents for 
Langston University (2001) 245 F3d 1172 (10th Cir); Paluck v Gooding Rubber Co 
(2000) 221 F3d 1003 (7th Cir); Holifield v Reno (1997) 115 F3d 1555 (11th Cir); 
O’Connor v Consol Coin Caterers Corp (1996) 517 US 308; Patterson v McLean Credit 
Union (1989) 491 US 164 (SC); McDonnell Douglas Corp v Green (1973) 411 US 792 
(SC). See also Charles A Sullivan, ‘The Phoenix from the Ash: Proving Discrimination 
by Comparators’ (2009) 60 Alabama Law Review 191, 204–06; Ernest F Lidge III, ‘The 
Courts’ Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment Discrimination Law’ 
(2002) 67 Missouri Law Review 831, 839. 
20  Great Britain Equality Act 2010, ss 13, 14, 19, 23. See also Sex Discrimination Act 
1975, ss 1(1), 5(3) and Lord Nicholls observation in Shamoon v Chief Constable of the 
Royal Ulster Constabulary [2003] UKHL 11 [4] and Dillon LJ in Bain v Bowles [1991] 
IRLR 356, 357. Cf Lord Nicholls’ qualification in Shamoon: ‘employment tribunals 
may sometimes be able to avoid arid and confusing disputes about the identification 
of the appropriate comparator by concentrating primarily on why the claimant was 
treated as she was… The most convenient and appropriate way to tackle the issues 
arising on any discrimination application must always depend upon the nature of 
the issues and all the circumstances of the case.’ ibid [11]–[12]. 
21  Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia [1989] 1 SCR 143, 164 (McIntyre J) (SCC); 
Hodge (n 2) [1], [20]ff.  
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 Strict comparison – primarily devised for single-ground claims – does 
not neatly transpose onto multi-ground intersectional claims. As the cases 
below show, the demand of finding mirror comparators has devolved into 
two options in intersectional claims—first, finding a single mirror comparator 
which did not share any of the personal characteristics of the claimant but 
was similarly situated otherwise; secondly, finding a mirror comparator for 
each ground individually.22 Both the options however seem to have failed in 
supporting intersectional claims. 
 The Court of Appeal struggled with both these choices in Bahl. The 
claimant in the case, Dr Kamlesh Bahl, was a Black Asian woman who had 
served as the Vice President of the Law Society. She alleged that she had 
been discriminated against on the basis of race and sex, by members of the 
Law Society in the determination of staff complaints against her. Gibson LJ 
laid down the following approach for testing her claim: ‘identify what 
                                                 
22  Although the ‘sex plus’ and ‘race plus’ approach in the US has meant that the 
second option in practice involves, for example, claimants such as women with 
young children to show difference between their position in comparison to men 
without the ‘plus’ characteristic of being parents of young children, i.e. using a 
single comparator even in ‘plus’ cases by taking into account the ‘main’ ground of 
discrimination only. The jurisprudence since DeGraffenreid thus, barely speaks to 
intersectional discrimination. Derungs v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc (2004) 374 F3d 428 
(6th Cir); Martinez v NBC Inc (1999) 49 FSupp2d 305 (SDNY); Coleman v B-G 
Maintenance Management of Colorado, Inc (1997) 108 F3d 1199 (10th Cir); Fuller v 
GTE Corporation/Contel Cellular, Inc (1996) 926 FSupp 653 (MD Tenn); Fisher v 
Vassar College (1995) 70 F3d 1420 (2nd Cir). Cf McGrenaghan v St Denis School 
(1997) 979 FSupp 323 (ED Pa) where the claimant, a mother of a disabled child, 
successfully proved sex plus discrimination when she compared herself to the 
woman without disabled children (who had replaced her). It is though useful to note 
that the claimant also had direct evidence of discriminatory animus on the part of 
the employer. 
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evidence goes to support a finding of race discrimination and what evidence 
goes to support a finding of sex discrimination’ such that ‘the evidence for 
each form of discrimination was [not] the same.’23 He insisted that for a claim 
of race and sex discrimination to succeed, the claimant should be able to 
prove both race and sex discrimination separately such that discrimination 
was based on ‘either race or sex’.24 Having announced that the claimant must 
show discrimination separately based on each ground, somewhat 
surprisingly, Gibson LJ then asked the claimant to show how her 
disadvantage as a Black woman was different from a white male.25 Since 
there was no other position comparable to that of the Vice President, with 
the same responsibilities and profile, he advised using a hypothetical 
comparator instead: ‘In a unique case such as that of Dr Bahl it is essential to 
ensure that the hypothetical comparator is a Vice-President who is on the 
receiving end of serious allegations of bullying but who is a white male.’26 
After examining the copious evidence presented before the Court, he 
dismissed Dr Bahl’s complaint for failing to reveal discriminatory reasons for 
her treatment as either race or sex based.27 The Court’s choice of treating the 
two grounds of race and sex separately but using a single comparator to 
                                                 
23  Bahl (n 10) [137]. 
24 ibid [115]–[137]. This route to examining a multi-ground claim may have resulted 
from the atomised nature of the UK discrimination law at the time when sex was a 
protected ground under Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and racial discrimination was 
prohibited separately under the Race Relations Act 1976. 
25  ibid [103]. 
26  ibid. 
27  Ibid [101] [126] [134] [147]. 
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prove both seems to have beleaguered Dr Bahl’s claim in four compounded 
ways.  
 First, the demand for proving race and sex discrimination separately 
and the insistence on using a single comparator of a white male to prove 
both, are fundamentally incompatible. On the face of it, strict comparison on 
the basis of race would have yielded the comparator of a white female, i.e. 
someone who does not share the personal characteristic of being Black but is 
similarly situated otherwise, including in terms of gender, like a Black 
woman. Similarly, strict comparison for sex would have yielded Black male as 
the appropriate comparator. If the Court of Appeal meant to discard these 
two comparators based on the individual grounds of race and sex in favour of 
a comparator which did not share any of the claimant’s personal 
characteristics, its initial demand for proving race and sex discrimination 
separately makes little sense. In going along with a single comparator of a 
white male, the Court seems to suggest that strict comparison in cases of 
multi-ground intersectional discrimination has to be one which relates to a 
mirror comparator who does not share any of the claimant’s personal 
characteristics.  
 But secondly, the choice of a single comparator of a white male fails 
in fundamentally appreciating the nature of an intersectional claim. This is 
because it only speaks to the unique nature of the disadvantage suffered as a 
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Black woman, but disregards the possibility of recognising any shared 
patterns of disadvantage with women and Blacks generally, and using 
evidence relating to these groups to establish intersectional discrimination as 
a matter of similarity and difference in patterns of group disadvantage 
transpiring simultaneously on multiple grounds. The understanding that 
intersectional claims can be appreciated in reference to what the claimant 
shares with other groups who are also disadvantaged based on just one or 
some of the grounds in a multi-ground claim thus falls by the wayside.28 In 
other words, such a comparison belies the complexity of intersectionality 
understood as a Venn diagram showing similar and different patterns of 
group disadvantage at the same time. Instead, it views such discrimination 
through the lens of single-ground framework which is appreciated not in 
terms of complex and concrete relationships of disadvantage between 
intersecting groups but always in contrast with or in opposition to the most 
privileged cognate group.29 
 Thirdly, the choice reveals the underlying judicial assumption that 
grounds like race and sex are defined by the binaries of Black-white and 
female-male, comparing disadvantaged groups to a single paradigmatic 
                                                 
28  Aileen McColgan, ‘Reconfiguring Discrimination Law’ [2007] Public Law 74, 81. 
29  See Sheila McIntyre, ‘Answering the Siren Call of Abstract Formalism with the 
Subjects and Verbs of Domination’ in Margaret Denike, Fay Faraday and M Kate 
Stephenson (eds), Making Equality Rights Real: Securing Substantive Equality Under 
the Charter (Irwin Law 2009). 
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dominant group.30 As Fredman remarks, the assumption here is that the 
abstract comparator be ‘clothed with the attributes of the dominant gender, 
culture, religion, ethnicity, or sexuality.’31 By formulating comparators this 
way, in a claim of race and sex discrimination, courts also assume other 
characteristics of privilege in being a (middle-class non-disabled 
heterosexual) white male. If it is expected for the comparator to be privileged 
in most ways but-for the claimant’s personal characteristic, the perfect 
comparator for an intersectional claim will then inevitably be a middle-class 
heterosexual non-disabled white male, i.e. someone whose personal 
characteristics are defined only by privilege. Such a comparator would fit any 
intersectional case, whether of a Muslim gay man or a disabled Sikh woman, 
because the hypothetical comparator will never share any of the 
disadvantaging characteristics with the intersectional claimant. Insistence on 
a comparator, who is privileged as against all disadvantaging identities, marks 
an unrepresentative norm which creates ‘powerful conformist pressures’ for 
claimants in discrimination law.32 Claimants with multiple disadvantaging 
identities may find it difficult to show difference in treatment or adverse 
impact as compared to this gold standard of a dominant comparator. Dr 
Bahl’s own claim resonated little with this hypothetical comparator because 
                                                 
30  Majury (n 13) 306; Radha Jhappan, ‘The Equality Pit or the Rehabilitation of Justice’ 
(1998) 10 Canadian Journal of Women and Law 60, 79.  
31  Fredman (n 7) 11.  
32  ibid 11, 168.  
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it was too removed from her actual position to reveal anything salient about 
how she was treated. The choice of a single dominant comparator group thus 
appears burdensome and perhaps inaccurate in pinning down the basis of 
intersectional discrimination in multiple grounds, and in similar and different 
patterns of group disadvantage.  
 Finally, the Court’s ultimate examination of testimonial evidence to 
discern the ‘the reason why’33 the claimant was treated as she was, had 
nothing to do with whether a white male would have been treated as Dr 
Bahl. Since at no point does the Court actually refer to how its preferred 
comparator would have been treated in Dr Bahl’s situation, the invocation of 
strict comparison appears without purpose.  
 These difficulties show that strict comparison with a single mirror 
comparator, whether real or hypothetical, may be too far removed from the 
close fit it promises in linking the precise nature of disadvantage to multiple 
grounds of discrimination. In fact, as the judicial meandering in one of the 
first US test cases (DeGraffenreid) shows, the normative and operational 
difficulties outlined above in applying strict comparison cannot be avoided 
even when the Court applies multiple comparators based on each ground 
individually instead of a single mirror comparator.  
                                                 
33  Bahl (n 10) [126].  
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 In DeGraffenreid, the District Court of Missouri rejected that the ‘last 
hired-first fired’ policy of General Motors discriminated against Black women 
on grounds of race and sex. In a rather terse judgement, the Court used two 
sets of comparisons to defeat the challenge. First, the Court used the 
statistics of favourable hiring of ‘female employees’ to dismiss the claim of 
sex discrimination.34 It compared Black women to those who shared their 
personal characteristic as women, i.e. white women, and yet were better off. 
Once again, the invocation of strict comparison in this context is suspect. The 
Court had found that the ‘lawsuit must be examined to see if it states a cause 
of action for race discrimination, sex discrimination, or alternatively either, 
but not a combination of both.’35 If it meant to treat Black women’s claim as 
two independent claims – one each on the ground of race and sex – its 
comparators too would have simply resembled those in single ground claims 
of race and sex. So strict comparison for sex discrimination would have 
pointed towards a mirror comparator which did not share the claimant’s sex, 
i.e. Black men or white men.36 Instead the Court compared claimants not 
with people who did not share their personal characteristic but those who 
did and were still not disadvantaged. Such a comparison obviously defeated 
                                                 
34  DeGraffenreid (n 8) 144.  
35  ibid 143.  
36  This being a recognised route for proving dual ground (‘sex plus’ or ‘race plus’) cases 
in the US, i.e. to find strict or mirror comparators based on each personal 
characteristic separately, and normally just for the main ground (rather than the 
‘plus’ characteristic) as if in cases of single-ground discrimination. See nn 19-22ff.  
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the claim of sex discrimination and also delimited the possibility of using 
white women’s experiences for analysing comparative disadvantage based 
on race. The latter is significant for appreciating intersectional discrimination.  
 The evidence of favourable treatment of white women could have 
been used to point towards the uniqueness of Black women’s disadvantage 
based on race.37  Instead of appreciating this, the Court dismissed the 
experience of Black women as being a part of sex discrimination at all or as 
showing racial discrimination between Black women and white women. Both 
the unusual invocation of strict comparison for the ground of sex, as well as 
the inability to use the comparison with white women as indicative of the 
race based disadvantage of Black women, thus depleted the Court’s ability to 
not only look for intersectional discrimination but also to independently 
establish race or sex discrimination. In effect, neither did the Court identify 
the right mirror comparator according to the tenets of strict comparison, nor 
did it use its preferred comparator to help appreciate intersecting forms of 
disadvantage.  
Secondly, in relation to race discrimination (and in contrast with its 
position on sex discrimination), the Court equated the claim of Black women 
                                                 
37  This is exactly what the female claimant argued in Philipsen v University of Michigan 
Board of Regents (2007) No 2:2006CV11977 (ED Mich) (‘Plaintiff argues that in “sex-
plus” discrimination claims, such as those she is asserting against Defendant, she 
need not show disparate treatment of a male comparator. Instead, she argues that 
she can satisfy her burden by showing that women without young children were 
treated differently than women with young children.’). The Court though disagreed, 
being ‘more persuaded by those that require the comparator to be outside of the 
protected class’.  
 20 
to that of Black men and found that race discrimination was not to be 
construed differently for the two groups. In doing so, the Court consolidated 
the present claim with a similar race discrimination claim sub judice in the 
Court.38 Its refusal to decide the matter in this instance was based on the 
suggestion that the experience of race discrimination was the same for Black 
men and women, thereby denying the possibility of using Black men’s 
experiences in appreciating the uniqueness of race discrimination suffered by 
Black women when it intersects with gender. Thus, the comparator group of 
Black men (i) conflated the similarities in the experiences of race 
discrimination such that the Black women’s experiences were subsumed 
within race discrimination alone; and at the same time, (ii) deflated the 
difference in the experiences of sex discrimination, by disconnecting Black 
women’s experiences from white women completely. In this way, Black 
women in DeGraffenreid fell through the cracks of both race and sex 
discrimination.39  
 But the Court could have compared the claimants to white women 
and Black men and inferred from their relative advantage, Black women’s 
                                                 
38  DeGraffenreid (n 8) 145.  
39  This approach has now been fortified to defeat Black women’s claims in a way such 
that evidence relating specifically to Black women is seen as showing a basis for 
neither race nor sex discrimination. For example, in Anthony, the Court observed 
that ‘the epithet “black bitch” cannot be designated exclusively as either racist or 
sexist’. Anthony v County of Sacramento (1995) 898 F Supp 1435, 1445 (ED Cal). 
Similarly in Lam, the Court observed that the lack of evidence of discrimination 
against Asian men or white women would not confirm specific forms of 
discrimination against Asian women per se. Lam v University of Hawaii (1994) 40 
F3d 1551, 1562 (9th Cir).  
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disadvantage associated with race and sex discrimination respectively; 
instead of denying sex and race discrimination at all. In failing to appreciate 
intra-group differences and inter-group similarities across different grounds, 
the Court missed intersectional discrimination with its constricted use of 
strict comparison.  
 In sum, two principal problems emerge in employing strict 
comparison in multi-ground intersectional claims like Bahl and DeGraffenreid. 
First, there is a lack of a background principle mediating the choice of 
comparators which exposes a normative gap in the judicial thinking 
responding to intersectional claims via strict comparison. As discussed above, 
neither the DeGraffenreid approach of choosing separate comparator groups 
nor the Bahl approach of a single dominant comparator group seem to be 
conceptually justifiable. If comparison must necessarily be invoked in 
establishing intersectional claims, it is but appropriate to ask on what basis 
are the comparators chosen.  
 Secondly, the choice of comparators reflects an understanding of 
single-ground or multiple discrimination rather than intersectional 
discrimination. Multiple discrimination reflects an understanding of 
discrimination based on multiple grounds individually, such that 
discrimination needs to be proved based on each ground separately.40 This 
                                                 
40  See also Bahl (n 10) [115]–[137].  
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thinking is rooted in single-ground discrimination, in that discrimination is 
seen as ultimately occurring on a single ground either alone or, in case of 
multiple grounds, as occurring discreetly and successively based on each. 
DeGraffenreid mirrors this approach in treating grounds as abstract and 
isolated such that they can be examined separately, rather than as 
intersecting to produce similar and different patterns of group disadvantage. 
The harm, as Gilbert and Majury point out, is that: ‘The claimants are not 
treated as whole people and the interactive nature of the sites of oppression 
is rendered invisible, even negated.’41  This harm of treating claimant’s 
identities as ‘severable and unrelated’42  instead of a whole, ultimately 
exacerbates the difficulty in appreciating the salience of an intersectional 
claim, i.e. similar and different patterns of disadvantage created by the 
intersection of multiple identities. This salience can only be appreciated 
when the claimant’s group identities are considered together, i.e. as a whole 
(like a Venn diagram), rather than by considering each identity or group 
(sphere) individually in isolation. The judicial failure thus lies in neglecting to 
fundamentally understand intersectional discrimination and in purposefully 
moulding comparison to respond to it.  
 
3. Flexible Comparison 
                                                 
41  Gilbert and Majury (n 13) 134.  
42  ibid. 
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Strict comparison continues to attract severe criticism not just for its 
incompatibility with intersectional claims, but also in failing to support 
traditional single-ground claims.43 In response, the Canadian Supreme Court 
proposed the flexible approach which makes it unnecessary ‘to pinpoint a 
particular group that precisely corresponds to the claimant group except for 
the personal characteristic or characteristics alleged to ground the 
discrimination.’44 Instead, it reaffirms the ‘general usefulness’ of comparison 
in establishing discrimination,45  and the possibility of employing single, 
multiple or no comparator(s). 46  While the Supreme Court has never 
adjudicated a multi-ground discrimination claim, this proposal was based on 
the estimation that ‘flexibility [could] accommodate claims based on 
intersecting grounds of discrimination.’47 It is then useful to evaluate flexible 
comparison in light of its motivation for supporting intersectional claims.  
 Does the flexible approach alleviate the challenges of strict 
comparison? What is its basis for abandoning comparison or allowing more 
                                                 
43  See Sophia Reibetanz Moreau, ‘Equality Rights and the Relevance of Comparator 
Groups’ (2006) 5 Journal of Law and Equality 81; Réaume (n 16); Pothier (n 16); 
Gilbert (n 16); Gilbert and Majury (n 13).  
44  Withler (n 2) [41]ff. Some US courts have followed a somewhat similar relaxed 
approach to comparison in ‘sex plus’ cases by bypassing the requirement to show 
differentiation as against men. Back v Hastings On Hudson Union Free School District 
(2004) 365 F3d 107 (2nd Cir); Trezza v Hartford, Inc (1998) No 98 Civ 2205, (SDNY). 
See n 37ff.  
45  Quebec v A [2013] 1 SCR 61 [169] (SCC). 
46  Jennifer Koshan and Jonnette Hamilton, ‘Meaningless Mantra: Substantive Equality 
after Withler’ (2011) 16 Review of Constitutional Studies 31, 53. 
47  Withler (n 2) [58] [63]. 
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than one comparator and for choosing between multiple comparators? The 
Ontario Court of Appeal’s extended discussion in Falkiner illustrates a rare 
instance of using flexible approach for establishing intersectionality and 
provides ample fodder for these inquiries.  
 In Falkiner, the claimants challenged the ‘spouse in the house rule’ 
under Ontario’s social assistance legislation which deemed them to be 
spouses as soon as they started cohabiting with their partners and thus 
excluded them from social assistance. The claimants were single women, 
with dependent children and in need of social assistance. Their case was that 
the rule caught casual try-on relationships which were not actually ‘spousal’. 
In being over-inclusive, it perpetuated the pre-existing disadvantage of single 
mothers on social assistance by excluding them from the beneficial 
legislation. This challenge was framed by the claimants as based on either sex 
or a combination of sex, marital status, and receipt of social assistance. The 
Court found that the impugned rule violated Section 15(1) of the Canadian 
Charter on ‘the combined grounds of sex, marital status and receipt of social 
assistance’48 and the discrimination was unjustifiable under Section 1. It 
reached this decision based on an elaborate application of the ‘flexible 
comparative approach [which] reflect[ed] the complexity and context of the 
respondents’ claim...’49 It did so by allowing a ‘set of comparisons, each one 
                                                 
48  Falkiner (n 12) [105]. 
49  ibid [81]. 
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bringing into focus a separate form of differential treatment.’50 The set of 
comparisons were based on each ground individually, and went thus:51 
 
 
Ground Claimant’s Choice Court’s Substitution 
Sex Men on social 
assistance 
Single men on social assistance 
Marital Status Social assistance 
recipients who are 
not single mothers 
Married people on social assistance 
Social Assistance Persons not on social 
assistance 
Single persons not on social assistance 
Table 1: Comparator Groups in Falkiner  
 Two questions must be asked here: first, what governed the flexibility 
in choosing the appropriate comparators? Secondly, does the approach 
resonate with the nature of intersectional discrimination? If the reasoning in 
Falkiner offers clear guidance in these two respects, the flexible approach can 
indeed be confirmed as reflecting ‘the complexity and context’ of the 
intersectional claim. But as the forthcoming analysis shows, Falkiner neither 
reveals a principled approach in using comparators flexibly nor does it help 
appreciate intersectional discrimination in the way multiple comparisons are 
chosen based on each ground individually.  
 The Court’s approach to fine-tuning the comparators offered by the 
claimants remains unsubstantiated in its reasoning. In the first instance, to 
                                                 
50  ibid [71] (emphasis supplied). 
51 It is useful to note that unlike other cases, it was not the government which offered 
revised comparators, but the Court which took upon itself to find the most suitable 
comparators. 
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support a finding on the ground of social assistance the Court substituted the 
claimant’s choice of ‘persons not on social assistance’ with ‘single persons 
not on social assistance’. Its explanation was that the comparison offered by 
the claimant ‘does not, on its own tell us anything meaningful beyond the 
fact that people on social assistance are treated financially differently than 
people not on social assistance.’ 52  On the other hand, the substitute 
comparator was preferable because:  
 
Framing the comparison in this way [as single persons not on social 
assistance] shows that the respondents have been treated unequally. 
They have suffered adverse state-imposed financial consequences 
because they began living in try-on relationships. By contrast, single 
people who are not on social assistance are free to have these 
relationships without attracting any kind of state-imposed financial 
consequences.53 
 
What, other than the Court’s own belief in its comparator group, shows 
unequal treatment better than the contender offered by the claimant or 
other possible comparator groups? There is no more on record which helps 
understand the Court’s choice. It is worth asking why the same result would 
not have followed from a comparator like ‘single women not on social 
assistance’, ‘single mothers not on social assistance’, or simply with the 
claimant’s choice of ‘persons not on social assistance’. Each of these possible 
alternatives could show that any single person not on social assistance had 
                                                 
52  Gilbert and Majury (n 13) 135.  
53  Falkiner (n 12) [73]. 
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the agency and resources to pursue try-on relationships without suffering the 
disadvantage suffered by the claimants specifically. It appears that the 
Court’s refinement is motivated by constructing as narrow a comparator as 
possible in strict terms based on a single ground at a time, such that social 
assistance was the only material difference between the claimants and the 
comparator group. But such a premise remains unarticulated and leaves 
hanging the question why the narrow comparator did not entail single 
mothers specifically. Even if comparison with single mothers not on social 
assistance revealed similar patterns of disadvantage rather than a position of 
advantage, it would have been relevant in establishing the connection with 
sex discrimination, i.e. patterns of disadvantage based on sex which interact 
with other grounds like dependence on social assistance, and child-care or 
marital status to produce both similar and different patterns of disadvantage 
for an intersectional claimant. But once again, the exercise of comparing 
advantage against disadvantage of cognate groups like in DeGraffenreid, 
overshadows comparison across grounds (and groups) to find similarities and 
differences which are the crux of an intersectional claim. The result 
resembles single-ground focus of strict comparison in effect.  
 In finding for sex as the basis of differentiation, the Court shifts the 
comparator group from ‘men on social assistance’ to ‘single men on social 
assistance’ but finally decides not in reference to either of these but on the 
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basis of available statistics directly relating to women and single mothers. 
According to Laskin JA, ‘the statistics unequivocally demonstrate that both 
women and single mothers are disproportionately adversely affected.’54 As 
he explained:  
 
although women accounted for only 54 per cent of those receiving 
social assistance and only 60 per cent of single persons receiving 
benefits, they accounted for nearly 90 per cent of those whose 
benefits were terminated by the definition of spouse. The 
corresponding figures for single mothers also show the definition’s 
disproportionate impact on that group.55  
 
 These statistics led him to make a partial conclusion to the point that: 
‘respondents [were] subjected to differential treatment on the basis of sex.’56 
If according to the statistics, single mothers on social assistance were in fact 
demonstrably worse-off, this finding could go on to support marital status as 
well as social assistance as markers (grounds) of differential impact. The 
statistical evidence in relation to the claimants themselves was perhaps all 
that was needed for the Court to make a determination in this case rather 
than going down the circuitous route of comparators which consumed most 
of the Court’s analysis. At least, under a flexible approach true to its terms 
which allows not necessarily relying on comparators, the Court could have 
foregone hustling with comparators for establishing sex discrimination or 
                                                 
54  ibid [77].  
55  ibid. 
56  ibid. 
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even discrimination on the combined basis of sex, marital status and receipt 
of social assistance. But since the evidence on record clearly showed relative 
disadvantage, the search for a definitive comparator group for each ground 
seems as redundant as disingenuous. 
 The fragmented use of comparative evidence to support separate 
grounds individually rather than seeing discrimination as accruing on the 
basis of intersecting grounds also undermines the concept of intersectional 
discrimination. To remind, framing comparators for each ground individually 
and using statistics to establish a single ground at a time, promotes an 
understanding of single-ground or multiple discrimination rather than 
intersectional discrimination.57 The underlying assumption being that a multi-
ground claim can be neatly broken down based on each personal 
characteristic to prove discrimination as a matter of multiple single-ground 
claims.58 The particular move of the Falkiner Court in treating comparison as 
operating on each ground individually disintegrates the claimants’ group 
identities and degenerates the claim into multiple discrimination, rather than 
intersectional discrimination.  
 This is paradoxical given the Court’s favourable final ruling and an 
otherwise generous framing of the flexible approach (which later became the 
official word of the Canadian Supreme Court in Withler – a single-ground 
                                                 
57  Majury (n 13) 334.  
58  Gilbert and Majury (n 13) 134, 137. 
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claim that applied the flexible approach just as Falkiner). In principle, the 
flexible approach relaxes the requirement for finding mirror comparators. 
This liberating suggestion remains doctrinally unexploited and hence 
unverified in the dogmatic insistence of the Falkiner Court on comparators 
and in any other case since.59 But since comparison did win the day for the 
claimants in Falkiner (even if the comparators were framed for each ground 
separately), flexible approach may have been too hasty in its suggestion to 
banish comparison from the discrimination inquiry completely. What 
becomes clear though is that the search for an instance of using 
comparison—(i) in an orderly fashion; and (ii) to identify similar and different 
patterns of group disadvantage based on multiple intersecting grounds, does 
not then terminate at flexible comparison.  
 
 
                                                 
59  In fact, the Supreme Court did not capitalise on the rare opportunity of examining a 
possible intersectional claim (marital status and gender) in Quebec v A (n 45) in 
reference to the flexible approach laid down in Withler. Quebec v A involved a 
challenge to the provisions of Civil Code of Quebec which excluded cohabiting 
partners from the scope of patrimonial provisions relating to marriage. The majority 
found that the exclusion was not discriminatory under s 15(1) of the Canadian 
Charter on the ground of marital status. But the Court was split variously. A majority 
of five judges (lead by Abella J) initially found that there was discrimination while 
the minority of four judges (lead by LeBel J) found that there was no discrimination; 
but in the final analysis, one of the minority judges (McLachlin CJ) joined the 
minority to find that the discrimination was ultimately justified under s 1 of the 
Charter. At no point did the split Court refer to comparative analysis for reaching its 
conclusions. The complicated comparative analyses in failed intersectional claims 
like Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh [2002] 4 SCR 325 (SCC) may have 
deterred the Court in going down the route of flexible comparisons despite 
approving the message from Withler. Quebec v A (n 45) [163]–[169].  
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4. Contextual Comparison 
 
The South African Constitutional Court has never considered comparators as 
essential in establishing discrimination. It has nevertheless resorted to 
contextual comparison in finding for unfair discrimination under Section 9(3) 
of the Constitution, especially in the context of proving intersectional 
discrimination in Hassam.60 The case involved a constitutional challenge to 
the validity of statutory provisions which excluded widows of Muslim 
polygynous marriages from intestate succession. The South African 
Constitutional Court found that the impugned provisions constituted unfair 
discrimination under Section 9(3) of the Constitution on the basis of gender, 
marital status and religion. Contextual comparison lay at the heart of this 
determination.  
 The Court used a range of comparators to identify multiple grounds of 
discrimination and then used comparative evidence in relation to these to 
establish similar and differences patterns of group disadvantage leading to 
unfair discrimination. In the first instance, the Court made seven sets of 
comparisons between widows in Muslim polygynous marriage and—widows 
married in terms of Marriage Act, widows in monogamous Muslim marriages, 
                                                 
60  See also Pillay (n 2) [42]–[44] (Langa CJ), [164]–[165] (O’Regan J) in regards the use 
of comparison under the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair 
Discrimination Act 2000.  
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widows in polygynous customary marriages,61 women/widows,62 Muslims,63 
Muslim men,64 and persons in other kinds of relationships.65 The differences 
between these groups and the claimant was then found to be:  
 
on the grounds of, religion, in the sense that the particular religion 
concerned was in the past not one deemed to be worthy of respect; 
marital status, because polygynous Muslim marriages are not 
afforded the protection other marriages receive; and gender, in the 
sense that it is only the wives in polygynous Muslim marriage that are 
affect[ed] by the [exclusion].66 
 
 In the second instance, discrimination based on these multiple 
grounds was found to be unfair under Section 9(3) and unjustifiable under 
Section 36 of the Constitution because it lead to redistributive and 
recognition harms such that the claimant group suffered not just ‘significant 
and material disadvantage’ but also from ‘serious effects of non-
recognition.’67 This conclusion was relative, i.e. established in relation to the 
position of the comparators groups.  
 In fact, the entire discrimination inquiry was pursued ‘contextually 
and in the light of [the South African] history.’68 So what stands out in the 
Court’s succinct but pointed reasoning is its contextual approach to 
                                                 
61  Hassam (n 14) [31]. 
62  ibid [10]. 
63  ibid [12] [25] [26] [33]. 
64   ibid [10] [31].  
65   ibid [11]. 
66  ibid [34]. 
67  ibid [34] [36] [37] [42]. 
68  ibid [33].  
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establishing intersectional discrimination. The selection of comparators does 
not appear to be based on either strict or flexible comparison. The Court 
neither replaces each of the three personal characteristics of the claimant 
with the cognate privileged groups or replace all of them at the same time to 
find a single comparator group, nor does it facially abandon reference to 
comparators but end up using them in fact. The selection in Hassam is 
comprehensive, covering every group which could have been relevant in 
identifying multiple grounds and the disadvantage accruing on their basis. 
The choice and application of comparators in Hassam can be rationalised as a 
Venn diagram (Figure 1). The claimant, a widow in a Muslim polygynous 
marriage, lies at the intersection of three groups: Muslims (M), widows (W) 
and those in polygynous marriages (P). Imagined thus, comparators in 
intersectional claims can pan the entire expanse of the Venn diagram such 
that any of the groups which share one, some or none of the claimant’s 
personal characteristics are relevant in establishing similar and different 




Figure 1: Comparators in Hassam (i)–(vii) 
 
 There could be seven possible comparator groups as depicted in 
Figure 169—a group which does not share any of the claimant’s personal 
characteristics and hence lies outside of the Venn diagram and constitutes 
part of the universal group of (i) others who are not Muslim, not widows and 
not in polygynous marriages; groups which do not share two of the 
claimant’s personal characteristics: (ii) non-Muslim widows not in polygynous 
marriages (who do not share the claimant’s religion and marital status), (iii) 
non-Muslims in polygynous marriages (who do not share the claimant’s 
                                                 
69  The exact number of possible comparators for different claims can be calculated 
based on the formula explained above (n 6)ff. As the succeeding discussion shows, 
they can also be identified with the help of a Venn diagram.  
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religion and gender), (iv) Muslims not in polygynous marriages (who do not 
share the claimant’s marital status and gender); and finally groups which do 
not share one of the claimant’s personal characteristics: (v) non-Muslim 
widows in polygynous marriages (who do not share the claimant’s religion); 
(vi) Muslim widowers in polygynous marriages (who do not share the 
claimant’s gender) and lastly, (vii) Muslim widows in monogamous marriages 
(who do not share the claimant’s marital status).  
 The Court referred to the comparator groups in these ways. It 
accepted the comparators offered by the claimant which compared her 
position to (ii), (v) and (vii), i.e. all other groups of widows who were either 
not in polygynous marriages or were non-Muslim or both. These groups, in 
the context of the South African law governing marriages and customary 
unions, comprised of: widows married in terms of the Marriage Act 
(coinciding with (ii)), widows in monogamous Muslim marriages (coinciding 
with (vii)) and widows in polygynous customary marriages (coinciding with 
(v)).70 With this the Court delineated the specific disadvantage suffered by 
women on the basis of marital status, gender and religion considered 
together. At the same time, since all these groups had gender in common, 
they were used to assert the shared position of disadvantage of widows per 
se, since women ‘constitute[d] a particularly vulnerable segment of the 
                                                 
70  ibid [9] [31] [32]. 
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population.’71 Similarly, the comparator groups who were not widows but (iv) 
Muslims not in polygynous marriages and (vi) Muslims in polygynous 
marriages were used to establish patterns of discrimination based on religion 
since, as pointed out by the claimant and the Court both, these groups 
symbolised entrenched historical discrimination based on ‘prejudice against 
the Muslim community’.72 But they were also used to establish difference in 
this pattern of religious discrimination between Muslim men and Muslim 
women, because only the former could acquire multiple spouses.73 Finally, 
the claimant and the Court referred to (iii) non-Muslims in polygynous 
marriages, i.e. African customary marriages, to appreciate the specific 
disadvantage of Muslims in polygynous marriages, one which did not accrue 
on African customary marriages.74 Together these comparator groups helped 
establish both the specific nature of intersectional disadvantage suffered on 
the three grounds together, as well as, the shared disadvantage between 
persons belonging to groups defined by one or two of the grounds. Note that 
the Court also moved beyond the binaries of Muslim/non-Muslim and 
polygynous/monogamous marriages to relate specifically to groups which 
made sense in the South African context, defined in terms of not just religion 
but those married under customary laws and under the Marriage Act, as well 
                                                 
71  ibid [10]. 
72  ibid [12] [25] [26] [33]. 
73  ibid [10] [31]. 
74  ibid [11] [34] [46]. 
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as those in other kinds of relationships. Comparison was thus not only made 
comprehensively but also contextually in light of the comparative evidence 
which fit the historical and current context of the claim.   
 In this way, the South African comparative approach differs from 
strict or flexible comparison. It is not strict like DeGraffenreid or Bahl, in that 
it does not focus on a single comparator or multiple single-ground 
comparators, but uses all comparators which could have been relevant in the 
context and useful in establishing the intersectional claim in reference to 
multiple grounds. It does not fragment or isolate the group identities of the 
claimant but considers them together, as a whole. The approach is not 
flexible like Falkiner, which excludes relevant comparators without 
explanation or relies on bogus comparisons or those too far removed to say 
anything pertinent about the claim. Where comparators were in fact not 
available, say the case of Muslim widowers in polygynous marriages – since 
Muslim women could not have multiple spouses – it did not use that fact to 
defeat the claim but in turn used it to establish patterns of sex discrimination. 
The chosen comparators were thus relevant, comprehensive, and most 
importantly useful in revealing similar and different patterns of group 
disadvantage, which is the crux of an intersectional claim.   
 Hassam’s comparative approach can thus be distilled into two steps: 
first, drawing on all relevant permutations of comparators available for an 
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intersectional claimant; second, examining the available evidence in relation 
to those comparators to draw conclusions about the nature of intersectional 
disadvantage suffered by the claimant. Both these steps individually feed into 
the two-stage discrimination inquiry traditionally followed by the South 
African Constitutional Court in establishing (i) whether there was 
differentiation based on grounds, and (ii) if it was actually discriminatory, i.e. 
unfair.75 So at the first stage of the discrimination inquiry, one can delineate 
the grounds of differentiation with the help of comparators who do not share 
one, some or all of the personal characteristics of the claimant. At the second 
stage, one can establish the unfair impact on the claimant in reference to the 
relatively privileged position of the comparator groups from a range of 
contextual, historical, testimonial, anecdotal or statistical evidence.76 In this 
way, contextual comparison avoids both the ‘arid and confusing disputes 
about the identification of the appropriate comparator’77 in strict comparison 
or using flexible comparisons without further justification.  
 
                                                 
75  The two-stage test for discrimination inquiry was devised by the South African 
Constitutional Court in esp Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) [54] (Goldstone 
J) and has been followed since.    
76  In fact, as Goldberg argues, contextual approach to comparison is primarily about 
‘what types of evidence will be considered.’ Suzanne B Goldberg, ‘Discrimination by 
Comparison’ (2011) 120 Yale Law Journal 728, 810. See also Beverley Baines, 
‘Comparing Women in Canada’ (2012) 20 Feminist Legal Studies 89; Merel Jonker, 
‘Comparators in Multiple Discrimination Cases: A Real Problem or Just a Theory?’ in 
Marjolein van den Brink, Susanne Burri and Jenny Goldschmidt (eds), Equality and 
Human Rights: Nothing But Trouble? (Utrecht University 2015) 211.  




The US courts have limited intersectional discrimination to two grounds with 
its ‘sex-plus’ or ‘race-plus’ approach established through strict comparison. 
The UK government, despite enacting ‘combination discrimination’ for up to 
two grounds under Section 14 of the Equality Act 2010, has not brought that 
provision into effect. While the Employment Tribunals have attempted to 
address dual ground claims outside of this statutory scheme, higher courts 
have not endorsed these efforts.78 The Canadian Supreme Court on the other 
hand has expressed its full support for potential intersectional claims,79 but 
has in fact never adjudicated on such a claim even when there were 
possibilities.80 The overall result, as Kotkin points out, is that ‘the courts have 
basically given up on the complex subject’ of evaluating multi-ground 
intersectional claims.81  
 The result though is unsurprising. As this article sought to show, the 
key tool of comparison in discrimination law has been central to the failures 
of test cases of intersectional discrimination. The doctrinal manifestations of 
strict and flexible comparative approaches in intersectional claims are rife 
                                                 
78  Fiona O’Reilly v BBC [1982] 3 All ER 1124; Ministry of Defence v DeBique [2010] IRLR 
471.  
79  Withler (n 2) [58] [63].   
80  See for example Egan v Canada [1995] 2 SCR 513 (SCC); Gosselin v Quebec (Attorney 
General) [2002] 4 SCR 429 (SCC); Mossop (n 11); Quebec v A (n 45).  
81  Minna J Kotkin, ‘Diversity and Discrimination: A Look at Complex Bias’ (2009) 50 
William and Mary Law Review 1439, 1462.  
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with inconsistences. These are not merely operational in nature but go deep 
into the conceptual roots of the two approaches telling us too little about 
how they are applied and can be useful in proving the distinct character of 
intersectional discrimination. Strict comparison, which is modelled on a 
single-ground vision of discrimination and insists on finding mirror 
comparator(s), is too unwieldy in pointing to a relevant comparator on a 
justifiable basis. Per Bahl and DeGraffenreid, the chosen comparator(s) is 
then applied in a way which tells us little about intersectionality as in similar 
and different patterns of group disadvantage. On the other hand, the flexible 
approach allows for comparison to be with a mirror comparator, a number of 
different comparators, or no comparator at all. While this formulation 
appears promising, its application by the Falkiner Court shows a preference 
for multiple strict or mirror comparisons based on each ground, highlighting 
an understanding similar to single-ground or multiple discrimination rather 
than intersectional discrimination. It also lacks a background principle which 
guides the flexibility in choosing comparators, reinstating the concerns 
identified in using strict comparison. Thus, the landmark intersectional claims 
in DeGraffenreid, Bahl, and Falkiner do not just represent the initial 
impediments in translating intersectionality into discrimination law but mark 
the continuing struggle in making it mainstream. In contrast, the contextual 
approach as exemplified in Hassam, engages with all relevant comparators in 
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an intersectional claim, i.e. the entire breadth of comparator groups which 
do not share one, some or all of the personal characteristics of the claimant. 
These comparators are then viewed in context and in light of the probative 
evidence at hand to appreciate similar and different patterns of group 
disadvantage. This approach is normatively aligned with intersectional 
discrimination in that the exercise helps identify such patterns as based on 
multiple grounds.  
 Now, such a broad contextual approach like South Africa’s is 
inevitably based on its own legal context. The right to equality and non-
discrimination not only has a constitutional status, it is considered 
foundational to the broader transformative aims of the Constitution.82 The 
South African model thus goes above and beyond the equal treatment or 
equal opportunity model of discrimination law and aspires to the equality of 
results. This background appears similar to the radical potential of the 
Canadian Charter which is interpreted as guaranteeing substantive equality 
under Section 15.83 The South African approach may map directly onto the 
Canadian substantive equality framework which, too, prefers contextual 
                                                 
82  See esp section 1 of the South African Constitution which lays out the foundational 
values of South Africa as based on human dignity, the achievement of equality, the 
advancement of human rights and freedoms, non-racialism and non-sexism. Cathi 
Albertyn and Beth Goldblatt, ‘Facing the Challenge of Transformation: Difficulties in 
the Development of an Indigenous Jurisprudence of Equality’ (1998) 14 South 
African Journal on Human Rights 248. 
83   Andrews (n 21) 164-171; R v Kapp [2008] 2 SCR 483 (SCC) [14]-[18]. 
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analysis of discrimination.84 Extending its contextual analysis from single-
ground to intersectional discrimination may prove to be easier and more 
normatively justifiable than using flexible comparisons. But both section 9 of 
the South African Constitution and Section 15 of the Canadian Charter are 
different from the legislative frameworks which are far more limited like 
employment discrimination in the US under Title VII and Great Britain under 
the Equality Act 2010. Questions of discrimination are asked in narrower 
contexts and applied far more pointedly to the situations at hand than in 
cases of constitutional adjudication which pan beyond the responsibility of a 
single employer to the standards applicable to the whole State. Yet, the 
nature of discrimination inquiry itself opens up all adjudicators to broader 
questions of context in which that discrimination operates—of sexism, 
racism, ageism, ableism, homophobia, etc. Thus, in a long line of single-
ground discrimination cases, the UK courts have consistently found that the 
‘relevant circumstances’ or ‘context' for comparison in employment cases 
includes ‘all the circumstances which are relevant to the way in which the 
[claimant] has been treated.’85 Individual cases of discrimination beyond 
employment, concerning denial of services or benefits etc, have also relied 
                                                 
84  Withler (n 2) [43] (‘The central and sustained thrust of the Court’s s. 15(1) 
jurisprudence has been the need for a substantive contextual approach and a 
corresponding repudiation of a formalistic “treat likes alike” approach.’) 
85  Shamoon (n 20) [48] (Lord Hope), [131] (Lord Rodger) (‘the comparison should 
proceed on the basis of all the circumstances that are relevant to the way that the 
employer treated the female employee who complains of discrimination’). See also 
Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police v Khan [2001] 1 WLR 1947 (HL) and 
Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [1998] IRLR 73. 
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on broader patterns of group disadvantage and contextual comparisons in 
gauging whether the discriminatory treatment or effects were based on a 
personal characteristic.86 The question that remains is whether evidence 
relating to such broader patterns of group disadvantage which fall within 
the ‘relevant circumstances’ or the ‘context’ of a case can be relied upon to 
establish claims of intersectional discrimination based on multiple grounds 
and multiple comparisons? Goldberg answers this question in the affirmative 
in the context of the US discrimination law.87 The UK courts too may find 
inspiration in what may at first blush appear to be a free flowing form of 
comparison but is in fact, per Hassam, far more precise and relevant in 
establishing intersectional claims.  
 Ultimately, the immediate intuitive grasp of comparison is what 
makes it so appealing in discrimination law. Its application can reveal both 
the disadvantage suffered and its basis in grounds. Even if strict and flexible 
approaches have failed to do exactly this, contextual comparison does help 
establish intersectional disadvantage suffered on the basis of multiple 
grounds. With the example of Hassam, this article has outlined the 
conceptual and doctrinal application of contextual comparison to fulfil this 
aim. The hope is that it revives the interest in claiming intersectional 
discrimination on multiple grounds—in understanding how it is to be done, in 
                                                 
86  Preddy v Bull [2013] UKSC 73 [52]-[53] (Baroness Hale); Walker v Innospec Limited 
[2017] UKSC 27 [5] [17]-[19] (Lord Kerr). 
87  Goldberg (n 76). 
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actually doing so by bringing and arguing such cases, and in adjudicating 
them successfully.  
 
